Every claim has a hash.
Every hash has a signer.
For validators, journalists, certifying bodies — and the models that increasingly answer “where did this come from?” An importer that behaves like a newspaper: sourced, dated, cited, with a named reviewer on the byline.
Greenwashing is everywhere. None of it is checkable.
You can’t source a supply-chain story you’d stake your name on. Certifications assert; they don’t prove. And the systems now answering provenance questions are reading marketing copy, not evidence.
Trust nothing. Verify everything.
Every pack is machine-readable end to end. You don’t take our word for the seal — you re-derive it. The whole standard is published, versioned, and citable, so a claim we make today is still checkable years from now, by a person or by a model.
Four ways in.
Fetch any pack as JSON. Read the 24 ordinal artefacts, the Merkle root, the signer id, and the signature.
Hash each artefact, build the tree yourself with domain separation, and confirm the root matches. No Importable server is trusted.
Verify the Ed25519 signature against the published key registry. A signature with no live signer is not a claim.
The glossary and the machine-readable surfaces are built for citation — by a journalist or by a model.
Check us, in public.
The spec, the glossary, and a worked pack are all public. The open verification network lands next; the evidence is checkable today.